

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 8038) to amend section 491 of title 18, United States Code, prohibiting certain acts involving the use of tokens, slugs, disks, devices, papers, or other things which are similar in size and shape to the lawful coins or other currency of the United States.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10) to encourage the establishment of voluntary pension plans by self-employed individuals; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MILLS, Mr. KING of California, Mr. BOGGS, Mr. KEOGH, Mr. MASON, Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin, and Mr. BAKER were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10650) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide a credit for investment in certain depreciable property, to eliminate certain defects and inequities, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MILLS, Mr. KING of California, Mr. BOGGS, Mr. KEOGH, Mr. MASON, Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin, and Mr. BAKER were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 12870) making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1963, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. SHEPARD, Mr. SKES, Mr. CANNON, Mr. JONAS, and Mr. TABER were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills and joint resolutions, and they were signed by the Vice President:

S. 167. An act to authorize the Attorney General to compel the production of documentary evidence required in civil investigations for the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and for other purposes;

H.R. 75. An act to amend section 2103 of title 28, United States Code, relating to appeals improvidently taken;

H.R. 857. An act to improve due process in the consideration and final adjudication of disputed claims for veterans' benefits by providing that the claimant shall be furnished a brief statement of the facts and law applicable to the case appealed and afforded an opportunity to reply thereto;

H.R. 860. An act to repeal certain obsolete provisions of title 38, United States Code, relating to unemployment compensation for Korean conflict veterans;

H.R. 1322. An act for the relief of Georges Khoury;

H.R. 1450. An act for the relief of Maria Odella Campos;

H.R. 1463. An act for the relief of Judy Josephine Alcantara;

H.R. 1678. An act for the relief of Jacques Tawil;

H.R. 2611. An act for the relief of Charles F. Ward, Jr., and Billy W. Crane, Sr.;

H.R. 4628. An act for the relief of Fotios Sakelaropoulos Kaplan;

H.R. 5234. An act to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide for the restoration of certain widows and children to the rolls upon annulment of their marriages or remarriages, and for other purposes;

H.R. 5317. An act for the relief of Mrs. Sun Yee (also known as Mrs. Tom Goodyou) and her children, Nale Har Yee, Shee Bell Yee, and Male Jean Yee;

H.R. 7328. An act for the relief of the estate of Lou's J. Simpson, deceased;

H.R. 7437. An act for the relief of Stella Rosa Pagano;

H.R. 7900. An act for the relief of Lt. (Jg.) James B. Stewart;

H.R. 9775. An act for the relief of Nihat Ali Uzun;

H.R. 9834. An act for the relief of Estelle L. Heard;

H.R. 10195. An act to validate payments of certain special station per diem allowances and certain basic allowances for quarters made in good faith to commissioned officers of the Public Health Service;

H.R. 10493. An act to amend title 18, United States Code, section 4163, relating to discharge of prisoners;

H.R. 11017. An act to amend section 4281, title 18, of the United States Code, to increase from \$30 to \$100 the amount of gratuity which may be furnished by the Attorney General to prisoners discharged from imprisonment or released on parole;

H.R. 11031. An act for the relief of George Wm. Rueff, Inc.;

H.R. 11122. An act for the relief of Edward J. McManus;

H.R. 11863. An act for the relief of Vernon J. Wiersma;

H.R. 11996. An act to amend the act of January 30, 1913, to provide that the American Hospital of Paris shall have perpetual succession;

H.R. 12157. An act to amend the Bankruptcy Act in respect to the salaries of retired referees;

H.J. Res. 627. Joint resolution extending the duration of copyright protection in certain cases; and

H.J. Res. 783. Joint resolution granting consent of Congress to the State of Delaware and the State of New Jersey to enter into a compact to establish the Delaware River and Bay Authority for the development of the area in both States bordering the Delaware River and Bay.

THE FUTURE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SOVIET QUISLING REGIME IN CUBA

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, over the past several weeks, some of our most distinguished Senators have made statements on the subject of Cuba, expressing diverse opinions. This is as it should be, if the Senate is truly to fulfill its advisory function in the critical realm of foreign affairs.

For my own part, I have hesitated to speak before today for several reasons. In the first place, I do not regard the Cuban situation as one which lends itself to a simple one-word or one-action solution.

I do not believe that the way to deal with it is to send in the marines tomorrow.

In the second place, I know how great the cares of the President are, and how many different factors must be taken into consideration in establishing our policy toward Cuba and toward Latin America as a whole. I do not wish to add to the great burden he is carrying. I want to help our President, and that is why I speak today.

But, in the course of the current debate on Cuba, there are certain things that have not yet been said; there are certain aspects of the situation that have not been given due consideration.

I speak today in the hope that I can contribute, at least in small measure, to the discussion which is essential to the clarification of our collective thinking on Cuba.

Mr. President, we live in a time when historic retribution is quick to follow upon each political folly or lapse of judgment.

Three and a half years ago, Fidel Castro and a band of several thousand guerrilla followers were made masters of Cuba when the dictatorial regime of Fulgencio Batista crumbled.

In retrospect, the innocence and gullibility of our policymakers at that time with regard to Castro seem almost incredible. There is strong evidence to show that, if the Eisenhower administration misjudged the Cuban situation so gravely, they did so because vital information was suppressed at desk position and because spurious estimates by publicly unknown subordinates became the basis for policy decisions of the gravest import for the Western Hemisphere.

Because of these totally misleading estimates, for more than another year, despite Castro's daily abuse of America, the official policy was to keep our minds open, to give Fidel Castro a chance, to avoid doing anything that would, so we were warned, drive him into the arms of Moscow.

But today Castro's Cuba is as completely communized as the Soviet Union or Red China. The Iron Curtain has been rung down 90 miles from our shores.

The Cuban peasants are being forced into state farms. The workers are exploited and oppressed more brutally than chattel slaves. An omnipresent secret police keeps every Cuban under daily surveillance. The land does not produce, and the shop shelves are bare. The one thing of which there is a surplus is Communist literature, designed to help brainwash Cubans of all ages.

The economy of Cuba has become completely slave to the Soviet economy. And, in recent weeks, there has been ominous news concerning the arrival in Cuba of massive shipments of Soviet military equipment and of thousands of Soviet military personnel. What this adds up to is that Cuba has today become a full-fledged military and political satellite of the Soviet Union.

On many points the recent reports have been publicly confirmed by the President or else privately confirmed to the press by the Department of State.

About the following points, I believe there is no dispute:

First. During the last week of July, 11 Soviet cargo ships and 5 Soviet passenger vessels arrived in Cuba.

Second. The passenger ships carried approximately 5,000 Soviet personnel, whom the Cuban press described as agricultural and industrial experts who had come to Cuba for the humanitarian purpose of assisting the Cuban people. President Kennedy, himself, has confirmed that approximately 3,000 of the Soviet experts who have already arrived in Cuba, or are on their way, are, in fact, military experts.

Third. The material unloaded included tanks, planes, anti-aircraft missiles, missile-equipped torpedo boats, and other military hardware of various kinds, communications equipment and heavy trucks.

Fourth. All of the ships arrived at night and were unloaded at night, according to eyewitnesses, by Soviet personnel.

Fifth. At least 15 additional ships bringing cargoes from the Communist bloc countries are at present on their way to Cuba. Some of these ships fly flags of NATO countries.

I can understand the State Department's desire to avoid statements which might unnecessarily aggravate the situation or alarm the American public. On the other hand, I believe that in a situation such as this the American public has a right to the unvarnished facts. From this standpoint I find it difficult to understand the assurances that were initially given to the American public that the Communist bloc personnel who entered Cuba aboard the ships which recently docked there were technicians in the nonmilitary sense. President Kennedy did the right thing in his statement of last Tuesday, when he set the record straight on this point and spelled out some of the details about the recent shipments.

But I have reason to believe, on the basis of information from reliable sources, that the situation in Cuba is even more grave than has yet been indicated to the American public.

What is more, the recent shipments of Soviet arms to Cuba are by no means the first. It can be stated as a matter of fact, that the Soviet bloc, prior to July of this year, had already delivered to Cuba 500 tanks of various sizes, 500 to 1,000 artillery pieces, between 50 and 75 Mig jet fighters, some 200,000 small arms, and mortars, anti-aircraft guns and other military hardware in substantial quantity. With these earlier shipments, it goes without saying, had come Soviet bloc specialists and instructors to train the Cuban Red Army in its use.

IS THE BUILDUP DEFENSIVE?

The fantastic buildup of Soviet planes and tanks and missiles and advisory personnel that has gone on in Cuba over the past year cannot be dismissed as purely defensive.

As the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. KEATING) pointed out last Wednesday, weapons per se cannot be divided into clearly defined defensive and offensive categories. Most weapons can be used for either purpose. It all depends on who wields the weapons and on the intent of the wielder.

No quantity of Soviet arms could give Castro the capability to invade the

United States. But accepting this fact, I still say that the massive buildup of Soviet arms in Cuba constitutes a threat to the security of the United States and of the Western Hemisphere, and that this buildup must be regarded as an act of aggression and as a prelude to further aggression.

It is an act of Soviet aggression against the people of Cuba, in the sense that it endows the quisling tyranny with greater military power to keep them in subjection.

It is a prelude to further aggression in the sense that the large shipments of Soviet arms which have already been unloaded in Cuba are now being transhipped, through clandestine routes, to Castroite movements in other Latin American countries, some of which are already openly fielding guerrilla forces.

It poses a distinct threat to the security of the United States in the sense that it gives Castro the military power to overthrow, or repeat his attempt to overthrow, the Government of Panama, thus placing the Panama Canal under the direct control of Moscow. In doing so, Khrushchev and Castro would not stage a frontal attack on Panama; they would attack by proxy, using an indigenous extremist movement as a front, and pretending to the world that the entire action had been initiated by the Panamanian people.

The Soviet arms buildup in Cuba poses a threat to the security of the United States in the sense that it places the Soviet Union in control of territories and of physical facilities which could prove of the greatest strategic importance in the event of a military showdown with the Soviets.

There is a growing feeling in our country, a feeling that cuts across party lines and political labels, that the time has come to face up frankly to these facts. There is a feeling that we cannot afford to delay much longer, because the longer we delay, the more difficult it will be to cope with the problem.

The existence of this popular conviction has been demonstrated by the many editorials and columns in the American press. The temper of the American people on this matter is further demonstrated by the very heavy mail which Congress is now receiving on the subject of Cuba, urging a stronger policy toward the Castro regime. My own office alone has received literally hundreds of such letters and telegrams. One of the chief reasons why I am speaking today is that I consider it my duty to let my constituents know where I stand on this issue.

HOW OUR POLICY WENT ASTRAY IN CUBA

Three and a half years ago, as I pointed out in my opening remarks, the Castro movement consisted of a mere handful of guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. At that time we might have prevented the establishment of a Communist beachhead on our very shores if we had listened to the warnings of our Ambassadors in Latin American countries and of our intelligence agencies. They warned us that, while there might not be conclusive proof that Castro, personally, was a Communist, there was proof that a number of his

chief lieutenants were Moscow-trained Communists and that the movement, as a whole, was to a dangerous degree under Communist influence. There were also many things in Castro's personal career, including the leading role he had played in the Bogotá riots of 1948, which at least strongly suggested that Castro himself had ties with the Communist apparatus.

Had we listened to these warnings, we would have striven to bring about an orderly transition from the Batista regime to a democratic and constitutional regime, directed against Castro as well as the extreme right. But, unfortunately, there were those in the State Department at the time who were prone to accept as gospel the evaluation of the Castro movement which found its way into the staid columns of the New York Times through the pen of Mr. Herbert Matthews.

Mr. Matthews assured the American public that Castro was not a Communist and that the Castro movement was not Communist dominated; and Matthews built up a hero image of Castro in which all the virtues of Robin Hood and Thomas Jefferson, of George Washington, and Abraham Lincoln, were combined in a single man.

The American people were fed more of the same hokum over the CBS network in a documentary film prepared by their Cuban correspondent, Mr. Robert Taber. Mr. Taber, who was dismissed by CBS when he was called before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, later blossomed forth as director of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a Castro-subsidized front organization which for some time enjoyed a considerable vogue in this country. It also developed that Mr. Taber had a long criminal record, which included convictions for robbery and kidnapping.

Because we were thus misled as to the true nature of the Castro movement, because the reports of our ambassadors and of our intelligence services were minimized or ignored, because some of the experts in our Latin American division assured their superiors, in almost vehement terms, that there was no proof that Castro was a Communist or that his movement was Communist dominated—because of these things we did nothing to prevent Castro from coming to power in Cuba. Indeed, to the extent that our diplomacy did intervene in Cuba, it intervened in a manner that was mathematically guaranteed to assure the installation of a Castro regime.

The Batista regime crumbled primarily because it was venal and inept and cruel and had lost popular support. But it was American policy that was responsible for the timing of Batista's downfall and for the fact that, when he fell, the only man who could fill the vacuum that was thus created was Fidel Castro.

No effort had been made to encourage the formation of a middle-of-the-road alternative to both Batista and Castro.

No effort was made to explore the possibility of an election under OAS auspices, which our Ambassador to Cuba had advocated and believed possible.

As another variant, we might have explored the possibility of democratic reform under a non-Castro regime by stabilizing the situation until President Rivero Aguero, who had been elected as Batista's successor in November 1958, could be formally installed in an inaugural ceremony that was scheduled for February 24, 1959.

But apparently no alternative to a Castro takeover was given serious consideration. Our position was that Batista had to go and go immediately; and if Castro was the only man on the scene able to take over at that time, then the prudent thing to do was to be nice to Castro and to give him a chance to prove that he was basically a "decent fellow."

Because this was our attitude, no effort was made to warn the Cuban people, the overwhelming majority of whom were anti-Communist, of the dangerous degree of control which Moscow-trained Communists exercised in the Castro movement.

When the Castro regime publicly revealed its true colors, a decision was made, during the last months of the Eisenhower administration, to give active assistance to the Cuban opposition in an effort to overthrow the Castro dictatorship. This effort could have succeeded; indeed, I am certain it would have succeeded, had we determined in advance to support the Cuban freedom fighters on their beachhead with American air cover, to assure the success of their undertaking. But in this case, a policy which had been rightly and soundly conceived was, I have reason to believe, undermined by divisions within the ranks of the President's principal advisers.

There was, in particular, great concern that active American involvement in the Cuban invasion would alienate many of the Latin American and Afro-Asian nations and further complicate our position within the United Nations.

With some advisers pulling one way, and some advisers pulling the other way, the Cuban freedom fighters and the cause of Cuban freedom became the inevitable casualties.

The freedom fighters did not receive the air support which had been considered essential to the success of the invasion; and the result was the Bay of Pigs disaster.

THE HIGH COST OF NOT TAKING DECISIVE MEASURES

To overthrow the Castro regime today—I have no illusions on this score—will require a far greater effort than it would have required 1 year ago.

But the cost of overthrowing it today would be infinitely smaller than the price we will have to pay 2 or 3 years hence, when we may very well be confronted not with a single Castro regime, but with some half-dozen Castro regimes scattered through Latin America.

Each year that we fail to face up to the danger of Castroism, the cost of confronting it goes up in geometric proportion.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks an article on Cuba written by the distinguished col-

umnist Roscoe Drummond, which appeared in the August 29 issue of the Washington Post. I consider it an article of such significance that I hope all Senators will find the time to read it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. DODD. The basic argument of Mr. Drummond's column is that we cannot expect the Castro dictatorship to die on the vine; that while there is hunger, undernourishment, and monumental mismanagement under the Castro regime, Castro, despite all this—I quote—"is steadily tightening his grip on the Cuban state and on the Cuban people—with so much Soviet help that he is both ally and captive."

Perhaps the most cogent argument against the "let Castro die on the vine" thesis was made by the internationally famous liberal historian, Salvador de Madariaga, one of Europe's most revered elder statesmen, who for many years played a distinguished role in the League of Nations. Professor de Madariaga makes this statement in his recent book "Between the Bear and the Eagle":

The argument that Castro had better be left alone and given enough rope to hang himself is worthless. The experience of other nations fallen into the unscrupulous hands of the Communist Party allows of no such optimism. Time could only make of Cuba an impregnable base for communism to spread all over Latin America. The Latin American governments who shilly-shally over it are only preparing the rope with which they will be hanged. Castro must go soon.

I concur wholeheartedly in this opinion. If we permit the Castro regime to remain on the Latin American vine, in the hope that it will perish, the chances are that, instead of perishing of its own weakness, it will spread its disease to the rest of the vine.

We have committed ourselves to a massive program, the Alliance for Progress, in an effort to rehabilitate and modernize the economies of the Latin American countries. But this entire program is vitiated from the outset by the mere existence of the Castro dictatorship.

The fact is that we are losing the cold war in Latin America and we shall continue to lose it so long as we use foreign aid, unsupported by vigorous political action, as the chief instrument of American policy.

I have heard from many sources that, in most of the Latin American countries, the Alliance for Progress program is virtually unknown to the man on the streets. True, the intellectuals do know about it; but, as things are today in Latin America, the majority of the intellectuals are prone to condemn the Alliance as a device for the enslavement of Latin America by "American imperialism."

We put up money to build schools and combat illiteracy and encourage higher education. But all too often the teachers in these schools and the professors in the universities are members of Communist-dominated unions, who use their American-supported educational facilities to teach their wards to hate America and despise capitalism, and to admire

everything that bears the Soviet brand-mark.

A recent survey in Venezuela showed that the percentage of Communist teachers in grade schools ranged from a high of 86 percent in some schools to a low of 33 percent in other schools. It also showed that there were 800 card-carrying students in the engineering school of the University of Venezuela.

In Brazil, according to the newspapers, the Communists also completely dominate the student movement. I quote from a New York Times dispatch from Rio de Janeiro, dated July 23:

The leftist-dominated National Students Union has elected an unopposed list of officers on a platform including opposition to the U.S.-sponsored Alliance for Progress.

In Mexico, according to a detailed report I have recently received, the Communists exercise a degree of control over the teachers' union which is nothing short of terrifying.

I want to say a few words about the situation in Brazil, because the dangerous turmoil that today exists in that country is characteristic of much of Latin America—and will, I am afraid, remain characteristic so long as the Kremlin is permitted to maintain an advance base for political and military subversion on the shores of the Western Hemisphere.

President Goulart's government, according to all reports, is weak and divided, and the Communists are gaining influence on many fronts—in the trade union movement, among the unemployed, among the impoverished peasants of northeast Brazil, among the students and intellectuals, in the ranks of government workers, and even in the top echelon of the Brazilian Government.

Although President Goulart during his visit to the United States sought to dissociate himself from his pro-Communist brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, Governor of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, Brizola still remains in office, and his popular influence has, if anything, increased. He has repeatedly called for the expropriation of all U.S. property in Brazil; and on February 16 of this year he set an example for other Brazilians by arbitrarily confiscating all of the properties of the International Telephone & Telegraph Co. located within his state frontiers, offering only token compensation.

It is also significant that the new Prime Minister of Brazil, Dr. Francisco Brochado da Rocha, was Secretary of Justice and the Interior in the government of Brizola at the time when the International Telephone & Telegraph property was expropriated, and he is credited by many persons with having been the actual brain behind the expropriation.

The temper of the statements that the Brazilian people are listening to from their political leaders offers small reason for encouragement. For example, on May 22 of this year, Governor Brizola addressed a group of law students, at a meeting which was generously attended by Government dignitaries and members of Soviet bloc embassies. In this nationally televised diatribe, which would

have done credit to Fidel Castro, the Governor told his audience that Brazil was being occupied and sacked by the "imperialistic capitalists of the United States."

He said that Brazilians should have the courage to take over U.S. firms in Brazil, to tell Americans to get out, unless they bring their families and children to Brazil and become Brazilians and learn Portuguese.

He also said that one more chance should be given democracy in Brazil. And he served notice on the present government that it must make all the reforms demanded: Change the constitution. Kick the U.S. interests out of Brazil. Stop the Alliance for Progress—and do it now—or else the revolutionary forces would do it in their own way. And he added that he would gladly accept leadership of the revolution.

There are some who say that we cannot deal with the problem of Castroism in Latin America unless we first deal with the problems of poverty and social backwardness and military dictatorship. I say that the converse is true: That we cannot properly deal with the problems of poverty and political instability unless we first deal with the problem of Castroism. In the interim period, we have no alternative but to endeavor to deal with both problems simultaneously.

It is not true that communism breeds only on poverty and political tyranny. I would point out to my colleagues that the government of Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela is commonly acknowledged to be one of the most democratic and socially progressive in Latin America, that the people of Venezuela enjoy a higher standard of living than any of their Latin American neighbors. But despite all these things—or is it precisely because of them?—the Communists have made the Government of Venezuela their No. 1 target in Latin America. Under Castroite instigation, Venezuela over the past 2 years has been the scene of riot after riot and uprising after uprising.

Let there be no mistake about it: The mere existence of Castroism makes political stability impossible in Latin America, and makes turmoil an epidemic condition. Fidel Castro, under Moscow's direction, has become both the principal organizer and charismatic symbol of the political and social chaos that today racks the lands of Latin America.

More than one Latin American political leader has faced up to the fact that so long as this turmoil is permitted to exist, there can be no way out but total chaos and ultimate communism. Speaking on August 16, for example, the Argentine Minister of Economics, Alvaro Alsogaray, stated the following:

If there is no political stability, if every day we are threatened by coups d'etat, if at every moment we are fearful that blood is to be shed among Argentines . . . if we look more like an anarchical state than an organized country, then this system of modern free economy with a social distribution of wealth, falls at its base and cannot work. We cannot attract capital under the permanent threat of revolution.

If the economies of Latin American countries are to be developed at a tempo

adequate for our times, it will require all the private capital, both domestic and foreign, that can be mobilized and brought to bear on the problem, through political encouragement and economic inducement. But the fact is that, since Castro took power in Cuba, there has been a serious flight of capital from virtually all the Latin American countries, a process of disinvestment rather than of investment. The inroads that Castroism has made in Latin America, the apparent stabilization of the Castro dictatorship, our failure thus far to take any active measures to terminate the problem, have all helped to produce a great outpouring of "frightened capital," seeking investment in safer areas.

I say that no foreign aid program, no matter how generously conceived, can act as a substitute for private capital. Foreign aid can render support to a program of private investment in the development of backward countries. But one of the prime functions of our foreign aid program, as I see it, is to create a climate that is hospitable to private investment. No sovereign government can be denied the right to expropriate property, in return for proper compensation, if it considers such action to be in the national interest. On the other hand, we must endeavor to set forth the facts about expropriation and the role of private capital to our Latin American friends. We must endeavor to explain to them that expropriation, historically, has weakened the economies of those nations who have practiced it; that it has resulted in an immediate deterioration in the management of the expropriated industries; that it has, at a later date, retarded their modernization and made it more difficult for them to compete in the world's markets; that it has, in effect, killed the goose that lays the golden egg by discouraging further capital investment in these countries.

I am convinced that we can get this across to the Latin American peoples because reasonable nationalists and true progressives have long since come to realize that expropriation is self-defeating. They have come to realize that the welfare of their people depends on their ability to foster a spirit of partnership between their governments and foreign investors, perhaps based on the profit-sharing formula which has now become so widespread.

Expropriation of foreign enterprises today remains the policy of only two groups: the lunatic nationalists like Mossadegh and the Communists. The Communist agitation for expropriation runs parallel to their vicious encouragement of antiwhite terrorism in the countries of Africa. The latter policy is designed to drive the white people physically out of Africa in order to create a political and social vacuum. The policy of expropriation, similarly, is designed to frighten out foreign capital already in the country and to keep away foreign capital that might have come in, for the purpose of creating an investment vacuum and further aggravating the economic hardship and social chaos on which communism fattens.

I come back to the point that there can be no serious program of economic

rehabilitation in Latin America so long as the Castro tyranny, which is the prime source of the expropriation sickness and of political turmoil in Latin America, is permitted to exist.

I say that the Alliance for Progress and the continued existence of the Castro regime are mutually incompatible—that one or the other will have to go.

THE NEED FOR A LIBERATION POLICY

I believe that the security of the hemisphere demands decisive action to put an end to the tyranny that today oppresses the Cuban people.

I cannot, however, agree with those who are today urging that we invade and occupy Cuba with American forces.

The call for an American military occupation of Cuba is false in its emphasis and lays us open to unnecessary attack by the Communist and Castroite propaganda apparatus. Because of this, an American military occupation of Cuba, even if carried out with dispatch and efficiency, might very well produce a worsening of the political situation throughout Latin America.

The Cuban people must be liberated from Soviet slavery. The right of self-determination must be restored to them. But the task of liberation must be carried out, in the first instance, by the Cuban people themselves. The role of the United States and of the other American nations must be limited to supporting the forces of Cuban freedom.

There is too great a tendency to accept Communist revolutions as irreversible and Communist regimes as permanent.

Indeed, this assumption somehow seems to have become an essential ingredient of our foreign policy.

It is an ingredient which seems to have had a paralyzing effect on our understanding and on our will.

It is not too much to say that unless we can succeed in shaking off this paralysis, the triumph of the Communist world over the free world is inevitable.

Even those who urge conciliation with communism will not dispute the statement that the Communists seek to subject the remaining free governments of the world by every means at their disposal—by propaganda, by political agitation, by infiltration, by guerrilla action, and, in certain cases, by direct military aggression. Nor would they question the statement that, employing these means, the Communists since World War II have annexed or succeeded in taking over the following roster of countries and territories: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, East Germany, North Korea, mainland China, North Vietnam, Tibet, northern Laos, and Cuba.

Rosters of names, I know, make dreary reading. But I do not think it would hurt us to repeat this roster to ourselves at regular intervals.

True, we did succeed in preventing the Communists from taking over in Greece, in Guatemala, and in South Korea. But the final outcome of the struggle is a matter of simple arithmetic if the Communists continue to annex new territories while we limit ourselves, at each

juncture, to defending, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully, what remains of the free world.

I believe that if Communist counter-revolutions are possible, revolutions for freedom are also possible. I believe that if Communist regimes can be imposed on peoples, there are also ways in which these regimes can be deposed. I believe that the entire record of the postwar period, indeed, underscores the vulnerability of Communist regimes and the feasibility of overthrowing them.

The Communist regimes are different from the orthodox tyrannies of the past in the sense that they are totalitarian, that under communism, not merely is opposition political activity proscribed, but every phase of human activity is brought under the control of the all-powerful state.

Wherever they have taken power, these regimes have shown themselves to be monumentally inefficient. That this is so should not be surprising, because the concept on which they are based runs completely counter to the grain of human nature. Whether it is in the Soviet Union or in Czechoslovakia or in China or in Cuba, these regimes have demonstrated an infallible genius for undermining agricultural production by destroying the will of the peasant classes to produce. In the name of creating an ultimate utopia, they have invariably subjected their newly acquired peoples to far crueller economic hardship than they had ever before experienced.

This combination of ineptness and cynicism, of economic hardship and religious persecution and total political tyranny, has, in turn, produced in the countries subjected by communism a hatred more violent and more universal in nature than anything heretofore recorded by history. The phenomenon of total dictatorship has, in fact, produced the phenomenon of the "total revolution," in which entire peoples, including the military forces under supposedly Communist direction, have revolted against their Communist masters.

The French Revolution was opposed not merely by the aristocracy, but by substantial sections of the middle class and, in certain parts of France, even by the peasants.

The American Revolution, in terms of popular support, was at best a majority proposition, with substantial portions of the population remaining loyal to the British Crown, while other portions remained uncommitted.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the Communist revolutions that have taken place since that time, were distinctly minority affairs, in which disciplined conspiratorial parties, numbering only a tiny fraction of the total population, succeeded in imposing their will on their peoples by force and by subterfuge.

But there was no such national division at the time of the East German uprising in 1953, of the Polish uprising of 1956, of the Hungarian revolution of October 1956, of the Tibetan uprising of March 1959. These national uprisings against Communist tyranny have been marked by their universal nature, by

the fact that in each case the armed forces sided with the people against the tyrants. The report of the United Nations Committee on Hungary, for example, made the point that, when the Red army invaded Hungary to put down the revolution, there was not a single recorded instance of Hungarian fighting against Hungarian. It was the Hungarian people as a whole fighting against the tanks of the Red army.

That the phenomenon of "total revolution" is not a freak or historical accident is further demonstrated by the fact that we have had four such uprisings over the past 9 years. This is all the more remarkable, because in each case these uprisings took place without foreign support of any kind, without internal organization, in the very teeth of the Soviet Army or the Red Chinese Army, and without any hope of intervention or military assistance by the free world.

The Polish revolution was frozen halfway because of the massive presence of the Soviet Red Army within Poland and on its frontiers. The East German uprising and the Hungarian revolution were defeated only by the open intervention of the Red army against the peoples of East Germany and of Hungary. The Tibetan uprising, similarly, was not put down by any Tibetan quisling apparatus; it had to be put down by the overwhelmingly superior military forces of Communist China.

If such a total revolution against communism were to take place in Cuba, however, its immediate success would be assured for the simple reason that the Soviet Union and Communist China would be in no position to intervene in Cuba as they did in Hungary and East Germany and Tibet.

Against this background, Mr. President, I do not think it unrealistic to suggest that we should strive to assist the Cuban freedom movement to build up its forces and to foster the conditions for a total anti-Communist revolution, uniting the Cuban people and the Cuban armed forces against the quisling tyrants who oppress them.

We should not wait for this revolution to take place accidentally or spontaneously. On the contrary, short of open military intervention by American military forces, we should do everything in our power to encourage and to assist the forces of Cuban liberation.

I believe that the proposal of Professor de Madariaga for collective action by the Organization of American States in support of Cuban freedom is the ideal for which we should strive. But if such action cannot be organized, if our Latin American friends continue to shilly-shally, then, as President Kennedy suggested in his historic speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors after the Bay of Pigs disaster, we must be prepared to act alone in support of the Cuban people.

Our patience is not inexhaustible—

Said the President:

Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction—then I want it clearly understood that this

Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are to the security of the Nation.

Like all of my colleagues, I have given much thought to the situation in Cuba. I should like to submit for their consideration a six-point plan of action for the liberation of Cuba.

I submit this plan with no sense of finality.

I recognize that other and more effective measures may conceivably be devised for coping with the problem.

I recognize, too, the infinite complexities that the administration must take into consideration in determining its course of action.

I believe, however, that in this critical situation, a moral obligation devolves upon the Senate and especially upon the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, to give this matter their most earnest consideration and to set forth their opinions and their suggestions in the hope that they can thus be of some assistance to the few men upon whom rests the ultimate responsibility of decision.

I believe the first measure we must take is to commit ourselves to a "declaration of independence and freedom for the Cuban people," so that the whole world will know that the decision has been made to completely eradicate the malignancy of Castroism.

Second, I believe that we should inform the Cuban exiles in this country that we are prepared to support the establishment of, and grant recognition to, a broadly representative provisional Cuban Government-in-exile. If the Cuban political leaders cannot achieve the minimum agreement essential to the establishment of such a provisional government, then I believe that the faculty of the University of Havana, most of which is now in this country, or alternatively, the several hundred members of the Havana Bar Association who have sought refuge here, should be constituted as a provisional government, committed to the holding of free elections within 1 year of the liberation of Cuba.

As a third and immediate measure—in anticipation of action by the Organization of American States—I believe we should invoke the Monroe Doctrine to proclaim a total embargo on shipments of Communist military materials and military personnel to Cuba.

The words of President Monroe never had clearer application than they have today in Cuba.

In his message to Congress on December 2, 1823, President Monroe asserted—

as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.

We owe it therefore to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those [European] powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their systems to any portions of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety—

I ask my colleagues to note carefully the wording of this statement, to note

that President Monroe spoke of extending—
their systems to any portion of this hemisphere.

I would also ask them to note with care the words of President Monroe when he said further in his statement that the United States would view as an—
unfriendly act any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them—the Latin American republics—or controlling in any other manner, their destiny, by any European power.

I believe that this wording applies clearly to the situation that exists in Cuba today. I cannot understand, indeed, how my good friend, the distinguished Senator from California, could take the stand that the Monroe Doctrine did not apply to Cuba because the Soviet armaments and Soviet personnel now in that country were there by virtue of an official request from the Government of Cuba. He stated:

The Monroe Doctrine applies to a situation in which a foreign power by force overthrows an established regime in this hemisphere.

As I read the Monroe Doctrine, it applies to "any interposition" for the purpose of oppressing the Latin American peoples or controlling their destiny "in any other manner."

Nor can I understand the legitimacy which he accords the Castro government in his statement. The Castro government was not elected by the people of Cuba and does not represent them. It is not an indigenous government, but a quisling Soviet regime which has been imposed on the Cuban people by deception and by fraud and by terror, and which now maintains itself in power only thanks to the massive presence of Soviet arms.

At the time President Monroe made his historic declaration, the United States was only a minor power compared with the great nations of Europe, and its navy was by no means the first in the world. Today we are indisputably the world's greatest power, while our navy dwarfs the navies of all the Communist nations combined. If the Monroe Doctrine cannot be enforced today to deal with a situation that more clearly violates its intent than has any other situation since its proclamation, then I say that the candid thing to do would be to strike the doctrine from our books.

It is, however, my confident expectation that, with or without the support of our Latin American neighbors, the wisdom of the Monroe Doctrine in its specific application to Cuba will be recognized, and the necessary action will be taken to implement it.

In invoking the Monroe Doctrine to prevent the shipment of Communist military materials and military personnel to Cuba we could, I am certain, make it abundantly clear that our action was directed not against the Cuban people but against the Soviet quisling regime. We might even give consideration to substituting a food ship, loaded with American surplus food, for every shipment of Communist arms of military contraband that was turned back.

Fourth, I believe that we should greatly intensify our entire propaganda effort with the frankly declared purpose of assisting the Cuban people to liberate themselves. We must direct this propaganda not merely to the people of Cuba, but to all the peoples of the Americas, documenting the facts about Castro's communism, about the treachery by which he imposed his Communist tyranny on the Cuban people, about the abandoned promises for free elections, about the catastrophic economic mismanagement that characterizes his regime, about the thousands of Soviet and Chinese experts who are now flooding the country, about the abject economic and political tutelage to the Soviet Union into which Castro has led Cuba.

As a fifth step, I believe we should be prepared, preferably in concert with the OAS nations, to impose a total blockade on all shipments to Cuba, other than shipments of food and consumer goods.

Sixth, I believe we should be prepared to give open and increasing assistance to Cuba's heroic freedom fighters, who are daily defying Castro's execution squads.

I note that there have been some editorials in our country which have deplored the action of the group of Cuban refugee students who recently bombarded Havana from makeshift craft that they had sailed from Miami.

According to these editorials, the U.S. Government should now take the most stringent action to prevent any such future expeditions by Cuban patriots operating from our shores. I would point out to these editors that none of them, to my knowledge, made similar protests when the Castro movement was seeking to overthrow the Batista regime, and when agents for the Castro movement were active in this country, raising funds for its support and purchasing arms and ammunition which they sent by plane and by ship to the Castro guerrillas from Florida ports. Indeed, it is amazing, in retrospect, to realize that there was no public protest over the virtually total suspension of American law enforcement when it was a matter of "arms for Castro."

I suggest that it is our moral duty to give the Cuban freedom fighters of today at least the same leeway that we gave the agents of Castro only several years ago. Indeed, I would urge that we not only support the resistance movement in Cuba, but that we openly support the creation of a "Cuban Freedom Legion" in exile, whose ranks would be open to all Latin American nationals.

To be realistic, we cannot completely exclude the possibility of military assistance to the Cuban freedom fighters. But I believe that this is a decision that can only be made at a later date and against the background of a plan of action similar to the one I have here outlined.

Let us not be deterred from a policy of liberation by the fact that the Communist nations and certain of the Afro-Asian nations will scream at the top of their lungs that American imperialism is engaging in military aggression.

It is the Soviet Union which stands convicted of political and military aggression in Cuba, and which, from its Cuban beachhead, is daily practicing political aggression against the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

Moreover, the Soviets and the Afro-Asian extremists have long ago forfeited all right to protest against unilateral military action.

A free Hungary threatened no one; but, in open defiance of the United Nations, the Soviet Union sent in an army of 5,000 tanks to crush the Hungarian revolution in blood and to impose an inglorious quisling regime which could not have mustered a hundred votes in the whole of Hungary.

Goa threatened no one; but, in violation of the U.N. Charter, India invaded and annexed the territory of Goa.

West New Guinea, as a colony of the Netherlands, threatened no one, and the Netherlands Government had already committed itself to a policy of self-determination for the Papuan people. But Indonesia has now succeeded in forcing the peaceful surrender of west New Guinea to Sukarno's imperialist ambitions, flagrantly violating the two cardinal tenets on which the United Nations is founded—the right of self-determination of peoples and the repudiation of force as an instrument for the settlement of disputes.

Let us not be deterred from our commitment to a free and independent Cuba by the hysterical protests of tyrants or opportunists who usurp the name of the Cuban people or hypocritically invoke the United Nations Charter. For I believe that the justice of this policy of liberation will be vindicated by the Cuban people themselves in free elections, under OAS auspices, on the morrow after their liberation.

THE NEED FOR A FREEDOM ACADEMY

In concluding my remarks, I wish to urge that instead of endeavoring to cope with disasters when they have grown full bloom, we must in the future find some way of anticipating disasters and preventing their emergence.

The situation in Cuba today and the ominous rumblings in so many Latin American countries, again point up the dismal fact that the Communists know how to wage political warfare and we do not—that we have been losing the cold war because, in effect, we have been amateurs fighting against professionals.

It was precisely to cope with this deficiency that the Senate, in the closing days of the 1960 session, passed a bill calling for the creation of a Freedom Academy—where research into the entire spectrum of Communist strategy and tactics could be carried out under the direction of the most competent men available from government and from private life; where measures could be devised to meet and contain the Communist offensive and to restore the initiative in the cold war to the free world; and where Americans called upon to represent their countries abroad, either in the service of their Government or in the service of private business, could be schooled in the interlocking complexities of political warfare.

The Senate Judiciary Committee, in reporting this measure favorably, described the bill as "one of the most important measures ever introduced in the Congress." But unfortunately, after being passed by the Senate, the bill died in the House because of honest but, I believe, misguided fears that the Freedom Academy, if it were ever established, would be taken over by those who are soft on communism, or, even worse, by infiltrators.

When the bill was reintroduced in the Senate in February 1961, it was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for consideration, at the specific request of the committee chairman and by unanimous consent. I regret to report that, over the intervening year and a half, no hearings have been held on this bill, and chances are that it will not be brought to the floor for public debate before the close of the session.

The establishment of such a training academy has been strongly advocated by nationally recognized authorities in the field of the cold war. For example, the Strausz-Hupe group in their book "A Forward Strategy for America," pointed out that while the United States has established academies to train men for war and a Foreign Service Institute to train diplomats, no comparable establishment trains Americans in the art of psychological warfare.

It is in the field of revolutionary conflict techniques—

Said Dr. Strausz-Hupe and his colleagues—

that the Communists hold a decisive margin of superiority over the Western Powers.

The need for a cold war training institution was also recognized by the so-called Sprague committee, which reported to President Eisenhower just before the close of his term. The committee strongly recommended that consideration be given to the establishment of a National Security Institute which "would provide concentrated exposure to and study of Communist ideology, techniques, and operations, worldwide, as well as of our total governmental informational resources, and the best ways to orchestrate and use them."

The need for such an institute has also been recognized and endorsed by the editors of our greatest national periodicals—*Life* magazine, *Saturday Evening Post*, and *Reader's Digest*; by the American Federation of Labor, with its extensive experience in combating communism both in this country and abroad; and by organizations like the Cold War Council, which was founded by people once prominent in the ADA, and the American Security Council, whose membership is primarily conservative and big business.

But above all, the need for a Freedom Academy has been underscored by the events that have taken place, at dizzying pace and in so many different parts of the world, since the Freedom Academy bill was first introduced.

There are those who have accused this administration of adhering to a "no win" policy, that is, of not wanting to win the cold war. I believe that this

charge is as mischievous as it is false. I am convinced, in fact, that there is no one in this administration who does not want to win the cold war.

The trouble is—and this is a trouble that has been true of every American administration since the close of World War II—that we do not know how to go about winning the cold war.

The trouble is that, while the Communists wage total political warfare, our own conduct is governed by conventional concepts of war and peace; when there is no war in the military sense of the word, we consider ourselves to be at peace and we conduct ourselves accordingly.

The trouble is that, while the Communist training schools every year turn out thousands of professional revolutionaries, some of them specialists in certain areas, others trained as conflict managers who know how to orchestrate all the instruments of political warfare, the free world continues to believe that traditional diplomacy and a conventional foreign service is all that is necessary to deal with the menace of communism.

The trouble is, in short, that, on the one side in the cold war, there are free world amateurs who look upon the struggle with communism as a phenomenon that can be resolved if we avoid provocation and conduct ourselves according to the Queensbury rules of 19th century diplomacy; while on the other side there is an international conspiracy disposing of tens of thousands of ruthless professionals dedicated to the total destruction of the free world, and nothing less than this.

I plan to speak at a later date on the theme that our chief trouble is that we do not know how to win.

Meanwhile, I would again point to the many ominous signs in the world situation as a reminder that the time has come for an end to amateurishness and an end to innocence.

We cannot afford any more Cuban disasters, or the luxury of performing postmortems for the purpose of discovering how and why these disasters occurred. The politics of hindsight must give way to the politics of foresight.

We must accept the fact of fourth-dimensional warfare, or psychological warfare, and we must equip ourselves with the knowledge and the means and the trained personnel required to meet the Communist onslaught in this dimension.

But above all, we must accept the underlying fact that we are locked in a life-and-death struggle with an enemy of infinite cunning and infinite ruthlessness.

Because the acceptance of this basic fact is the beginning of all political wisdom in the world in which we live today.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Connecticut yield?

Mr. DODD. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from New York.

Mr. KEATING. I am sorry that every Member of the Senate was not present to hear the analysis of the situation in

Cuba delivered by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut.

The Senator from Connecticut has advanced a program which does not involve armed action against Cuba at this time, action which I think most of us would agree would be a mistake; but he does set forth a six-point program, clearly after considerable study. There are two points about the Senator's address to which I should like to add a word.

One has to do with the analysis which the Senator from Connecticut has made of the nature of the weapons which are now located in the advanced Soviet base which is Cuba, weapons which cannot in any sense be considered purely defensive. Whether a weapon is defensive or offensive depends entirely upon the triggerman or the operator of the particular weapon and the person or the nation against which the weapon is turned. True, Mig fighters, tanks, missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and torpedo boats are defensive weapons; but they are also offensive if the desire is to use them offensively.

The other point relates to the analysis of the Monroe Doctrine. As the Senator has said, it was contended by the distinguished Senator from California (Mr. ENGLE) and has also been contended by others—and I venture to say that the Senator from California was enunciating the present policy of this administration—that the Monroe Doctrine is not here involved because Soviet Russia was invited to Cuba by the existing Government of Cuba.

Think what that reasoning leads to. It means that in any Latin American country, all that needs to happen is a coup d'etat, following which the government which takes over by force may call in Soviet Russia or Communist China, or some other Communist country; and thereby the Monroe Doctrine will not apply. At present the situation is the Monroe Doctrine minus one country; and the next country which has a coup d'etat will make the situation the Monroe Doctrine minus two. Pretty soon, all that will be left will be the Monroe Doctrine applying to the United States of America.

President Monroe made it abundantly clear that if the Monroe Doctrine is to remain in force—and I do not believe it is the policy of the United States to have it junked—it should cover cases in which our southern brethren—meaning the Latin American Republics—had imposed upon them by force from the outside the ideologies and the principles of a foreign power, which they would not of their own accord adopt. That is exactly what has happened in Cuba. Today Cuba is a Communist state; and communism was imposed upon Cuba by the world Communist movement, of which it is now apparent that Fidel Castro is a part, and admittedly so. Castro and Khrushchev have had the effrontery not only to admit but also to boast that they are making a military base of Cuba and are increasing military supplies and military personnel there.

I believe, as does the Senator from Connecticut, that we in Congress who feel strongly about this situation have

a duty to speak out on this question and to be certain that the American people are fully informed about it.

Ours is a government of the people. The American people, if they know all the facts in relation to this situation, will, in my judgment, be able, through their congressional representatives and in conjunction with the executive branch, to support a conclusion and a solution which will protect the security of our country. I feel that the Senator from Connecticut has today made a significant contribution to that end.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am deeply grateful to the distinguished Senator from New York. As usual, he is very generous.

As I have said openly, my intent was to make a small contribution to the current discussion of this subject. I think the Senator from New York has himself made a most significant contribution to it. All we are trying to do is to think things out and set forth our views.

I am aware that this is a difficult problem. There is no easy solution of it. It is satisfying to know that in this wonderful body we can speak our minds, and perhaps, in that way, help those who have the principal responsibility to make the right decision.

As I have said on many other occasions, I am glad to have the warm and comforting words of the great statesman from New York [Mr. KEATING].

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 29, 1962]

CASTRO NOT DYING ON VINE—FIDEL'S FALL SEEN POSSIBLE, BUT ONLY IF HE IS PUSHED

(By Roscoe Drummond)

PORT-OF-SPAIN, TRINIDAD.—Nowhere in Latin America have I encountered any support for the wishful thinking in Washington that Castro is going to die on the vine or that the Cuban dictatorship will soon fall from its inner weaknesses.

The prevailing view in the Latin American capitals I have visited is that while conditions in Cuba are getting steadily worse, the Castro regime itself is becoming steadily more entrenched.

One South American newspaper correspondent, who had spent considerable time in Cuba and left only recently, put it this way: "Fidel Castro is proving himself totally incompetent to manage the affairs of his nation, but extraordinarily skillful in managing the apparatus of a police state."

This raises a question of acute importance to policymakers in Washington who are rather counting on waking up some morning and finding that Castro has disappeared in the dust.

QUESTION IS POSED

The question is whether any Communist police state, holding all the weapons of terror and repression in its own hands, can ever be overthrown by a popular uprising armed with little more than sticks and stones.

There is no doubt that conditions are deteriorating inside Cuba. There is clearly developing an angry, resentful, frustrated and humiliated people who, while still passionately supporting the "Castro revolution," are heartsick over what Castro has done to the revolution.

The evidence is mounting that there is hunger and undernourishment. Cuba used to produce food for export and now cannot supply the needs of its own population.

Private farmers have no incentive to increase their crops, and the peasants on the state collective farms are wondering when they are going to receive "their land" as promised by Castro. They still can't quite realize that Castro's Communist state has taken over both the land and the peasants to work it.

The situation is so out of hand that you have the upside-down condition of farmers appealing to the cities to send them food.

Economic aid from the Soviet Union and Red China is failing to live up to promises—even as Fidel has failed to live up to his promises. Castro is finding that Communist bloc assistance—except arms—is not only doled out very carefully, but is also costly. Cuba's slim reserves of foreign currency are steadily being drained away, largely because Cuba no longer has the exports it can sell to the hard-currency countries.

But Latin American sources on the continent are convinced that Castro is steadily tightening his grip on the Cuban state and on the Cuban people—with so much Soviet help that he is both ally and captive.

Castro's armed forces seem to be all that he needs—and more—to prevail over any opposition that might develop. The Soviet Union is stepping up its shipments of arms and thousands of technicians. Castro has recruited the forces in ample volume. There is every reason to assume that the army is loyal to Castro's bidding. While the regime has been unable to feed his people properly, it has taken care to see that its troops are a favored class. This means that the Castro army is massively armed, well fed, and heavily disciplined for its duty—to keep the dictatorship in control at all costs.

A LIBERAL'S VIEW

A distinguished European liberal who has recently visited Latin America contends that Cuba ought to be liberated by the Organization of American States. These are the words of Salvador de Madariaga:

"The argument that Castro had better be left alone and given enough rope to hang himself is worthless. The experience of other nations fallen into the unscrupulous hands of the Communist Party allows of no such optimism. Time could only make of Cuba an impregnable base for communism to spread all over Latin America. The Latin American governments who shilly-shally over it are only preparing the rope with which they will be hanged. Castro must go soon."

But wishful hoping will not free the Cuban people. Castro will fall—only if he is pushed.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD several articles relating to the Cuban situation.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 2, 1962]

RED DECISION TO BOOST AID TO CASTRO IS SEEN

(By Donald May)

The Soviet Union appears to have made a major policy decision to prop up the Castro regime in Cuba and draw it closer to the Communist camp, U.S. observers said yesterday.

Administration officials, who a week ago reported a big increase in Soviet military aid to Castro, gave this updated account of the situation:

Military supplies believed to include transportation, electronics, and construction equipment which had been reported being unloaded at Cuban ports late July and early August, apparently are being transported to sites around the island.

Officials feel it is a pretty safe prediction that the supplies will turn out to include Soviet antiaircraft missiles similar to the U.S. Nike. The prediction is based on other equipment which has been identified and the fact that Russia has given such missiles to Iraq and Indonesia.

A number of small patrol craft arrived as deck cargo aboard Soviet ships. It is not clear whether they were torpedo boats, as reported Friday by Senator KENNETH S. KEATING, Republican, of New York.

ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

There is no evidence yet that Moscow has sent equipment to monitor U.S. rocket launchings at Cape Canaveral, Fla. The electronic equipment which appears designed to bolster coastal and air defenses.

It is theoretically possible that such equipment could be used to interfere with ground signals that control the Canaveral rockets. But officials doubt that Russia or Cuba would try this. The United States could retaliate. The result would be a very expensive "rocket-jamming war."

It is considered very improbable that stations located in Cuba could send out signals to alter the course of U.S. rockets. This would mean obtaining the exact secret codes by which the rockets are controlled.

The most probable estimate of the number of Soviet-bloc technicians to arrive in Cuba recently is 3,000. It could be 5,000. There is no good estimate of what percentage are military technicians, but probably more than half are.

Though there are still many rumors that the military technicians are troops organized into combat units, all U.S. information from trained observers indicates the contrary. They are not in uniform and appear to be limited to installing the new military equipment and training Cubans in its use.

Senator HOMER E. CAPEHART, Republican, of Indiana, has called for a U.S. invasion of Cuba and KEATING has accused President Kennedy of withholding information about Soviet troops from the American public.

Much of the U.S. policy thinking on Cuba recently has centered on the broader trend of Russia's deepening involvement in Castro's affairs.

The Cuban economy is not thought to be on the brink of collapse but it has been going steadily downhill.

SUGAR CROP FAILURE

Cuba's 1962 sugar crop appears to be a failure. The harvest produced 4.8 million tons against an announced goal of 5.4 million tons, compared with a yearly average of 6 million tons over the previous 5 years.

The coffee harvest now underway in Oriente Province may also be in trouble. Because of labor problems, there apparently is a large-scale mobilization of students being carried out by the Government to harvest the crop.

Cuba's Labor Ministry announced last week a freeze on wages and curbs on absenteeism and vacation time. Cuban labor unions have made voluntary sacrifices in the past but this was the first time the order came directly from the Government.

FOOD RATIONS CONTINUE

Food rationing has been in effect since March. The economy also is plagued by lack of consumer goods, inflationary prices, and low production. Foreign exchange is at a new low.

Russia announced last Tuesday that Soviet shipments of economic aid goods to Cuba in 1962 would be twice that of last year. And since much of Cuba's economic troubles come from administrative bungling, some officials believe Russian advisers may now take an increased role in Government management.